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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 10-2773 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JAMES FREEMAN, 
                                      Appellant 
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE 
(D.C. Crim. No. 09-cr-00038-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Joseph J. Farnan, Jr. 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 20, 2011 
____________ 
 
Before: BARRY, AMBRO and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 5, 2011) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
James Freeman appeals from the 240-month sentence that the District Court 
imposed upon him following his guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute cocaine 
and marijuana.  We reject each argument raised by Freeman on appeal, and will affirm the 
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District Court‟s sentence on count one.  Because, however, it is apparent to us that the 
District Court‟s sentence on count two exceeded the statutory maximum, we will sua 
sponte vacate the sentence imposed on count two and remand for resentencing on that 
count. 
I.  Background 
 On March 23, 2009, Freeman shipped a package from a UPS facility in Tucson, 
Arizona, to an address in New Castle, Delaware.  Four days later, when the package was 
en route in Wilmington, Delaware, agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration 
searched the package and discovered a glass table inside.  The table contained a 
hydraulically operated trap that concealed 20.75 kilograms of marijuana.   
 Freeman was arrested outside his home on March 30, 2009.  During a search of his 
home, agents discovered a table in the basement.  The table featured a hydraulically 
operated trap concealing 34.07 kilograms of cocaine.  Sitting atop the table was a fish 
tank that featured a similar trap concealing $215,450 in United States currency. 
 On April 16, 2009, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Freeman with one 
count of possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(A), and one count of possession with 
intent to distribute a detectable amount of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(D).  On December 17, 2010, pursuant to a plea agreement with 
the government, Freeman pleaded guilty to both counts. 
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 The plea agreement recited the parties‟ agreement that the base offense level was 
thirty-four, as well as their expectation that Freeman would qualify for a three-level 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility.  The plea agreement noted that the maximum 
penalty for count two, the marijuana count, was a term of imprisonment of five years.  
The District Court also explained at the plea hearing that the maximum penalty on count 
two was a term of imprisonment of five years. 
 At sentencing, on May 13, 2010, the Court confirmed that there were no objections 
to the Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”), which yielded an advisory guidelines range of 168 to 
210 months.  It also heard from defense counsel, who articulated several reasons why 
Freeman should receive a below-Guidelines sentence:  he had been severely affected by 
the untimely deaths of his brother and sister, he had a loving relationship with his wife 
and children, and he suffered from numerous physical ailments.  
 Freeman then addressed the Court: 
When my brother had got incarcerated, you know, like, you know, my 
mother she would always say, I feel good that he‟s in jail, you know, as 
opposed to him being on the streets, because of the trial and tribulations that 
people are afflicted with when they are on the streets.  And, you know, it 
was such a tragedy when [my brother died in prison], because no one 
thought it would happen, you know, by him losing his life in jail, you know, 
and this had a strong effect on the family, you know.  
 
… 
 
It wouldn‟t be nothing for me, you know, inside a prison system in 
Philadelphia, because I‟m around the people that I know.  Now it‟s totally 
different now, you know. I‟m in another state, you know, I‟m totally 
unaware of.  I don't know the people that are here, you know, and, you 
know, it‟s different now, you know. 
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(63a-67a.)  Following remarks by the government, the District Court imposed sentence: 
When I came into the courtroom, I was thinking you know, maybe [defense 
counsel is] right, ten years is enough, because I‟m very concerned about 
disparity in sentencing and in over-sentencing people, because I realize one 
day deprived of your liberty is a lot of time.  Ten years is a huge amount of 
time.  I want you to understand that I don‟t take it lightly. 
 
And I kind of, when I came here I was thinking, Well, maybe ten isn‟t 
enough.  The Government‟s 168 months, 14 years is too much.  11 years. 12 
years.  
 
But as what happens, every once in a while after listening to you talk, I 
became convinced that ten years wasn‟t enough, 12 years wasn‟t enough.  
And, in fact, you‟ve convinced me, just like you had taken responsibility for 
the act [sic], that 14 years isn‟t enough for someone like you.  
 
What you‟ve convinced me of here today by your articulation is that you 
really need to be incarcerated for a longer period of time, because you have 
no appreciation for the amount of drugs you were distributing and what it 
did to your victims.  Your victims aren‟t here in the courtroom.  They are 
the young people that used the cocaine.  They are the young people that 
used that marijuana and got their lives distorted.  You got them off track.  It 
doesn‟t account for the victims in law enforcement whose lives you have 
put at risk by being involved in a dangerous business. 
 
Drug trafficking, in the amounts that you were trafficking, and as I reflected 
on you talking about your time in the Philadelphia prison system, it had no 
impact on you, because it was like going on vacation from the 
neighborhood, you were with all your friends. 
 
. . . 
 
I'm going to sentence you to 20 years, 240 months. 
 
Pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and after considering all 
the factors set forth in 18 United States Code, Section 3553(a) it‟s the 
judgment of the Court that the Defendant, James Freeman, is hereby 
committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, to be imprisoned for a 
term of 240 months on Count I, and a term of 120 months on Count II, with 
the sentences to be served concurrently. 
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(75-76a.)  On June 2, 2010, the District Court entered a judgment on the docket that 
reflected the identical sentence. 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  When reviewing a 
sentence on appeal, we first ensure that the sentencing court did not commit a serious 
procedural error, “such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines 
range [or] treating the Guidelines as mandatory.”  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 
(2007).   We then “review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under an abuse-
of-discretion standard,” while keeping in mind that “[a]s long as a sentence falls within 
the broad range of possible sentences that can be considered reasonable in light of the 
§ 3553(a) factors, we must affirm.”  United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
III.  Discussion 
 Freeman contends that the District Court‟s application of the section 3553 factors 
constituted both procedural and substantive error.  Neither contention has merit. 
A.  Procedural Error 
1.  Failure to Respond to Defense Arguments 
 Freeman first contends that the District Court failed to directly respond to several 
of his arguments in support of a below-Guidelines sentence, including his physical 
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disabilities, his close ties with his family, the impact that the death of his two siblings had 
upon him, and the fact that his criminal history was nonviolent.  This argument fails, as 
precedent makes clear that a district court‟s failure to respond to each and every section 
3553 argument does not constitute procedural error warranting remand.  See Rita v. 
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 358 (2007) (concluding from district court‟s failure to 
respond to certain sentencing arguments that the district court “must have believed that 
there was not much more to say”); United States v. Olfano, 503 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 
2007) (concluding from district court‟s failure to respond to certain sentencing arguments 
that “the District Judge apparently determined that defendant‟s arguments were simply 
insufficient to warrant a below-Guidelines sentence”).1 
2.  Failure to Explain Why Guidelines Range Was Inadequate 
 Freeman further contends that the District Court failed to explain why the range 
recommended by the Guidelines was inadequate, in light of section 3553‟s command that 
the court impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”  This argument is 
meritless, as the District Court spoke at length about its reasons for imposing the sentence 
that it did.  The District Court, moreover, was not required to specifically explain why the 
sentence that it selected was the lowest possible sentence that would satisfy the parsimony  
                                                 
1
  We also note that defense counsel informed the District Court that “[t]here‟s nothing in 
my client‟s background that would justify or excuse any of this” (48a) and that the death 
of his sister was “not a justification for anything” (57a).  Freeman similarly explained that 
the crime was “totally my fault” and not “my parents‟ with raising me.” (63a.) 
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provision.  See United States v. Charles, 467 F.3d 828, 833 (3d Cir. 2006) (“To meet the  
requirements of the „Parsimony Provision,‟ he contends, the District Court should have  
noted why a low-end Guidelines-range sentence (37 months) was insufficient to meet 
§ 3553(a)(2)‟s penological goals. By demanding that the Court assume the burden of 
proving that his sentence is not unreasonable, Charles attempts to flip the reasonableness 
requirement on its head.”). 
3.  Seizure of Drugs 
 Finally, Freeman contends that the District Court erred in noting the effects that 
narcotics had on the victims of his conduct, as the drugs at issue were seized before they 
could reach users on the street.  While Freeman is correct as a factual matter, in context it 
is clear that the District Court was speaking generally about the effects of the drug trade 
on victims.  That the government successfully arrested Freeman and seized his drugs 
before they could reach the street hardly supports a plea for leniency. 
B.  Substantive Reasonableness 
 Freeman‟s final contention is that the total 240-month sentence, which fell thirty 
months above the top of the Guidelines, was substantively unreasonable in light of the 
mitigating evidence available to the District Court.  Yet while Freeman made colorable 
arguments in mitigation, the District Court acted within its discretion in rejecting these 
arguments. See United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (2009) (en banc) (“[I]f the 
district court‟s sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable 
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sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 
the reasons the district court provided.”). 
C.  Count Two 
 Notwithstanding the lack of merit in the arguments that Freeman brings on appeal, 
we will sua sponte vacate and remand with respect to the sentence imposed on count two, 
which charged Freeman with possessing with intent to distribute a mixture containing a 
detectable amount of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D).  
Section 841(b)(1)(D) provides that the maximum penalty, “[i]n the case of less than 50 
kilograms of marihuana,” is “a term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years.”  21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D).
2
  The District Court‟s imposition of a ten-year sentence on this 
count fell outside the statutory maximum, and we may notice this error sua sponte.  See 
United States v. Dixon, 308 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2002).  Accordingly, we will vacate 
the District Court‟s sentence on count two and remand for resentencing within the 
statutory maximum on that count. 
                                                 
2
  Section 841(b)(1)(D) further provides that if a person “commits such violation after a 
prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, such person shall be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 10 years.”  21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(1)(D).  Although Freeman was twice “adjudged delinquent” as a juvenile for 
narcotics offenses (PSR ¶¶ 34-35), we have held that being adjudged delinquent as a 
juvenile “is not the same as an adult conviction” and thus that “„prior conviction‟ as used 
in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) does not include adjudications of delinquency under the 
Pennsylvania Juvenile Act.”  United States v. Huggins, 467 F.3d 359, 361-62 (3d Cir. 
2006).  The logic of Huggins applies equally to (b)(1)(D), and it is presumably for this 
reason that the plea agreement, the District Court at the plea hearing, and the pre-sentence 
report all agreed that the maximum penalty on count two was a term of imprisonment of 
five years.   
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IV.  Conclusion 
 We will affirm the judgment of sentence on count one and vacate and remand for 
resentencing on count two.   
 
